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Abstract   
Multinational enterprise performance is one of the most researched topics in the strategic 
management literature over the last thirty years. Despite the proliferation of studies, the 
dispute over the relation between firms’ international investment activities and corporate 
performance has not yet reached a consensus. This paper’s contribution is threefold. First, we 
focus on entry by West European multinational enterprises into Central and East European 
countries. Second, we develop a multi-theory argument, combining insights from transaction 
cost, new institutional, behavioral, resource-based and international strategy theories. Third, 
we estimate the determinants of managerial satisfaction with subsidiary performance with 




Multinational enterprise (MNE) performance is one of the most researched topics in the 
strategic management literature over the last thirty years (Miller, 2004). The relation 
between multinationality and performance has not only “generated a flurry of empirical 
studies” (Kotabe et al., 2002), but has also produced inconsistent findings. Over thirty 
studies have tackled a range of linear (positive or negative), curvilinear U-shaped, 
inverted U-shaped and S-shaped relations between the degree of firms’ multinationality 
and their performance (recent examples are Kotabe et al. 2002; Goerzen and Beamish, 
2003; Capar and Kotabe, 2003; Lu and Beamish, 2004). Despite the proliferation of 
studies, the dispute over the relation between firms’ international investment activities 
and corporate performance has not yet reached a consensus. It could be that other 
factors, in addition to firms’ degree of multinationality, dominantly influence firms’ 
performance. Following standard strategic management logic, there are two prominent 
groups of such factors that received some, albeit insufficient, attention in the past: 
firms’ environmental contingencies and their organizational capabilities.  
Moreover, with a few exceptions, most studies on MNEs’ performance addressed 
the concept of geographic scope as a unidimensional construct, and did not account for 
host-countries’ environmental diversity (Goerzen and Beamish, 2003). We argue that 
because local environmental specificities are not similar, various geographic locations 
may have divergent effects on MNEs’ performance. Hence, the consideration of host-
country characteristics is of critical importance in studies on foreign direct investment 
and MNEs’ performance. In addition, we believe that performance is largely 
conditional upon the firms’ competitive capabilities. Past studies on multinationality-
performance relations have at best controlled for firm-specific variables (Kotabe et al., 
2002), thus leaving the importance of firms’ assets and capabilities, required to 
effectively maximize the advantages of internationalization, largely under-researched. 
In conclusion, despite the fact that there has been an abundance of studies on MNEs’ 
performance, more research is necessary to illuminate the extent to which firms 
endowed with specific capabilities to establish subsidiaries in diverse environments 
benefit from their international activities (Wan and Hoskisson, 2003).  
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This study makes the following threefold contribution to the extant literature. First, 
unlike the majority of studies on MNEs’ performance, which mostly examined either 
international expansion into developed countries or into a single emerging economy 
(particularly China), we investigate the level of satisfaction of West European business-
unit managers with the performance of their subsidiaries in eight Central and East 
European (CEE) transition countries.1 Second, in a review of strategy research on 
emerging economies, Wright et al. (2005) identify four conceptual perspectives – 
transaction cost theory, principal-agency theory, resource-based theory and new 
institutional theory. In a similar vein, we argue that a single-theory approach in studies 
on transition will limit our comprehension of the magnitude with which diverse 
endogenous and exogenous factors influence MNEs’ performance. In this study, 
therefore, we combine elements of new institutional theory, transaction cost theory, 
behavioral theory of the firm, resource-based view and international management 
theory to analyze how a set of exogenous host-country characteristics – i.e., transition 
economies’ institutional structure and national culture2 – and a set of endogenous firm-
level heterogeneities, namely MNEs’ capabilities (intangible assets and strategies) and 
ownership stake, may influence managerial satisfaction with subsidiary performance.   
Third, to determine drivers of MNEs’ performance, earlier work has typically used 
information from corporate-level financial reports, such as annual return on sales and 
return on assets. In this study, we focus on a different level of analysis: we examine the 
performance of MNEs’ subsidiaries, which represent business-unit international 
expansion activities. Furthermore, due to the inaptness of officially published corporate 
performance estimates, unavailable business-unit-level information or incomparable 
annual reports for all subsidiaries, we conducted an international survey to capture the 
managers’ level of satisfaction with the performance of their subsidiaries. In fact, as far 
as subsidiaries’ survival is concerned, we believe that headquarters’ subjective 
evaluation of subsidiary performance is of critical importance: Geringer and Herbert 
(1991) report that in the case of international joint ventures particularly those perceived 
by the parents as successfully performing were more likely to remain in operation.  
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
A multi-theory approach 
Entries of MNEs from developed economies into emerging countries3 have created an 
ever-rising “appetite for knowledge” about these markets (Meyer, 2004; Ramamurti, 
2004). Transaction cost theory (TCT) and its offspring, internalization theory, are 
considered to be the dominant theoretical perspectives in foreign direct investment 
studies (Dunning, 1993). Although emerging economies provide “a new ground to test 
and refine TCT”, its popularity measured by the number of articles applying the theory 
is rather limited in comparison to other perspectives such as the resource-based view of 
the firm (Wright et al., 2005: 4). TCT’s key constructs such as transaction costs, 
opportunism and uncertainty are, beyond doubt, highly relevant in transition economies, 
though: the arguments presented by Hoskisson et al. (2000) that transaction costs are 
higher in emerging economies than in developed countries are difficult to dispute.  
The reason for TCT’s unpopularity among transition economies researchers is 
perhaps the fact that, given the hundreds of TCT studies already published in the 
literature, it is difficult to make a “solid contribution” based on an exclusive TCT 
perspective (Wright et al., 2005: 4). In a strive for theoretical contribution, yet retaining 
the benefits of TCT’s robust analytical tools, some authors have extended the theory 
with insights from new institutionalism to better fit with the specificities of transition 
economies. On such premises, it is argued that institutional differences between 
developed and transition economies exacerbate transaction costs (Meyer, 2001). Yet, 
there are avenues for cross-bridging TCT or resource-based logic with other theoretical 
domains that remain largely unexplored. We argue that that the entry mode choice and 
performance are conditional upon a parent’s strategic posture thus the key role of 
MNEs’ intangible resources can be further emphasized with insights from international 
management’s theory of international strategy.  
This type of argument suggests a multi-theory approach. We will explore such an 
eclectic perspective in this paper, too, focusing on a specific issue: the explanation of 
differences in the managerial satisfaction with subsidiary performance. If for managers 
from developed economies the process of establishing a successfully operating outlet in 
a transition economy narrows down to one leading challenge, namely “How to make 
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their strategy work” (Wright et al., 2005: 7), then investigating the level of satisfaction 
with subsidiaries’ performance will give a clear indication of their success or failure in 
the implementation of “western” strategies. In this line of argument, we further 
demonstrate how the differences between the context of business activity (CEE 
transition economies) and the setting of subsidiary evaluation (west European MNEs) 
shape perceptions of subsidiaries’ success or failure. Given our focus on managerial 
satisfaction, a natural candidate to add to the multi-theory approach is the behavioral 
theory of the firm (BTF). After all, BTF’s very core deals with how managerial 
satisfaction is linked to adaptation and learning (Greve, 2003). Below, we will 
introduce the pieces of our multi-theory puzzle step by step, suggesting one specific 
hypothesis for each of our five theoretical lenses. Figure 1 summarizes our logic, 
linking the five theories to five key variables and the associated hypotheses. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
So, this paper’s approach is eclectic. Although all five theories share similar 
assumptions (e.g., about bounded rationality and environmental contingencies), we will 
not really integrate them into an overall logic other than that they together suggest a set 
of variables that may well influence managerial satisfaction with subsidiary 
performance. In future work, we hope to contribute to the development of integration 
by focusing, for instance, on possible interaction effects. In the context of the current 
paper, though, our first step of testing a series of main effects simultaneously will 
suffice. After all, as far as we know, this study is the first one doing that as 
comprehensive as we propose here. 
 
Transaction Cost Theory: Ownership Stake 
The first line of argument is based upon straightforward transaction cost theory (TCT) 
logic. In transition economies, the effective transfer and implementation of non-capital 
resources, be they technical or organizational, often requires the involvement of the 
parents’ expatriates because of shortages of local labor with the expertise and 
experience for managing these processes (Child, 2002). In CEE acquisitions, for 
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example, MNEs either inherit “mediocre assets and managers who lack the skill, 
resources, and expertise to manage firms in competitive market environments” 
(Uhlenbruck et al., 2003: 258) or the magnitude of the required change exceeds many 
of local managers’ and employees’ cognitive abilities (Newman, 2000). Uhlenbruck 
and De Castro (2000) provide evidence that MNEs in CEE tend to improve efficiency 
and performance because of the capital, new technologies and management skills 
provided to their local subsidiaries.  
Indeed, the transaction cost model of foreign direct investment stresses the 
importance of a firm’s intangible assets. Hennart (1991) notes that because the transfer 
of knowledge and other intangible-intensive resources comes with high market 
transaction costs, parent firms typically prefer equity transactions. The argument is that 
the parent that supplies the most critical resources and has the greater expertise should 
obtain the ownership arrangement that would provide optimal incentives to invest the 
necessary assets that will contribute to subsidiary performance (Mjoen and Tallman, 
1997). Therefore, the more critical the strategic resources transferred abroad are, the 
more likely it is that the parent will desire whole ownership – or, if that is not possible, 
the highest possible level of ownership. As a mirror image, we have 
HYPOTHESIS 1 (ownership stake): A greater ownership stake is positively 
associated with managerial satisfaction with the subsidiary’s performance. 
 
New Institutional Theory: Institutional Inefficiency  
The rise of new institutional theory (NIT) in social sciences dates back to the 1970s, but 
the ascendance of NIT as a leading perspective, is a more recent phenomenon (Wan and 
Hoskisson, 2003). According to Peng (2000), research on emerging economies has 
helped propel the NIT perspective to the front line of the strategy research agenda. 
Hoskisson et al. (2000) content that although NIT presents the most applicable 
paradigm for explaining firm behavior in emerging economies, the number of studies 
using an institutional perspective is rather limited. In the most recent review of NIT 
research, Wright et al. (2005: 6) conclude that the studies on firms from developed 
economies entering into emerging economies and analyzing the impact of institutions 
on foreign entrants’ strategies have “barely scratched the surface”. Moreover, regarding 
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extant research on MNEs’ performance in European transition economies, to the best of 
our knowledge, only Uhlenbruck and DeCastro (2000) and Uhlenbruck (2004) took an 
institutional approach.4 Clearly, the richness of the transition setting to test the 
applicability of western strategies provided by emerging economies is not yet fully 
exploited. 
In comparison to the traditional transaction cost theory approach that focuses on 
“the technical environments of individual transactions” (Lu, 2002: 22), new 
institutional theory emphasizes broader institutional contexts (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1991). While both Williamson (1975) and North (1990) acknowledge the importance of 
transactions, North emphasizes the central role of the larger environment in 
constraining the optimality of a firm’s actions. The role of institutions in an economy is 
to lessen “both transaction and information costs through reducing uncertainty and 
establishing a stable structure that facilitates interactions” (Hoskisson et al., 2000: 253). 
The relative economic and social stability in developed countries promotes the 
development and acceptance of certain rules of exchange (Hitt et al., 2000). In contrast, 
the rules of exchange in transition economies are largely emergent, because the 
institutional instability in such economies produces ambiguity and uncertainty (North, 
1990). Furthermore, market economy rules and requirements were not in place when 
the communist system collapsed, because for decades markets were closed and 
industries were protected (Peng, 2003).  
The replacement of the old central planning regimes with market economy 
mechanisms requires multifaceted government activities to secure a consistent 
transformation. Those activities range from restructuring and privatizing businesses to 
initiating legal and institutional reforms to establish the rule of law. Furthermore, 
government agencies face the challenge of liberalizing markets, introducing 
competition policies, keeping inflation under control, and sustaining a viable financial 
sector and a foreign exchange regime that permits profit repatriation (IMF, 2000). CEE 
transition economies are currently at different stages of transformation, still to a certain 
extent being regulated, thus presenting an institutional environment that is profoundly 
different from what a typical Western firm would encounter in the developed world 
(Peng, 1994). MNEs in CEE emerging markets have to adopt strategies that fit with an 
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institutional environment characterized by inefficiency, instability and unreliability 
(Meyer, 2001). 
The pace of dismantling old institutions does not necessarily coincide with the 
speed of constructing new institutions: there is typically a period of incremental 
evolution full of uncertainties (Peng, 2003). In North’s words (1990: 6), “although 
formal rules may change overnight as the result of political and judicial decisions, 
informal constraints embodied in customs, traditions, and codes of conduct are much 
more impervious to deliberate policies”. Specifically, “informal constraints rise to play 
a larger role in regulating economic exchanges in these countries during the transition” 
(Peng and Heath, 1996: 504; emphasis added). Moreover, to combat uncertainty and to 
overcome initial inabilities to use market mechanisms, economic agents in CEE 
economies continued to rely on the inherited systems of personal networks that “earlier 
served to overcome shortages under the central plan” (Meyer, 2001: 358). Personal 
networks in both business and political circles have retained their importance as a 
coordination mechanism during transition to a market economy (Puffer, 1996). Upon 
entering CEE, western MNEs often lack sufficient information about local partners, do 
not have effective personal networks in place, and face unclear regulatory frameworks, 
inexperienced bureaucracies, underdeveloped court systems, weak protection of 
intellectual property and widespread corruption (Meyer, 2001).  
Any multinational expansion is typically challenging with respect to overcoming 
the liability of foreignness (Andersen, 1993; Inkpen and Beamish, 1997) because 
regulatory restrictions on foreign firms, among other factors, contribute to the costs of 
doing business abroad (Zaheer, 1995a). Expansion into transition economies, 
characterized by institutional inefficiency and environmental turbulence, is perhaps 
more difficult, necessitating even greater efforts (Luo and Peng, 1999). Peng (2003: 
279) contents that in a transition environment, the costs to engage in relational 
contracting are high because transaction parties “need to build strong social networks 
through a time- and resource-consuming process.”  Thus, in addition to the transaction 
costs associated with overcoming liabilities of foreignness and managing business 
operations in an institutionally volatile environment, western MNEs bear additional 
costs related to an integration into diverse personal and government networks. Because 
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of all the costs incurred, MNEs in the CEE region may experience dissatisfaction with 
their subsidiary’s performance dependent on the level of host-country institutional 
inefficiency. Hence, we suggest 
HYPOTHESIS 2 (institutional inefficiency): The level of institutional inefficiency in 
terms of (a) instability and (b) corruption of a host country’s institutional 
environment is negatively associated with managerial satisfaction with the 
subsidiary’s performance.  
 
Behavioral Theory of the Firm: Cultural Distance 
National culture relates to the unique ‘soft’ features of a host country’s ‘way of doing 
things’ (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2001). National cultural distance between countries 
has been associated with significant differences in their legal systems, administrative 
practices and working styles (Hofstede, 1980; Shane, 1992). Extensive empirical 
research has shown that the greater the national cultural distance, the larger the 
difference in terms of routines and practices (Hofstede, 1980; Morosini et al., 1998). 
For instance, routines and practices related to innovation have been found to vary 
significantly across countries along Hofstede’s (1980) “individualism-collectivism” 
dimension (Shane, 1993). As a result, the organizational routines and practices that 
create firms’ competitive advantages are often constrained by national culture (Kogut 
and Singh, 1988; Hofstede et al., 1990), and therefore difficult to replicate in other 
national cultures (Barney, 1986). 
International business literature suggests that cultural differences deteriorate the 
applicability of MNEs’ capabilities in the local environment (Barney, 1991; Madhok, 
1997), yet extant empirical support for this argument is scarce. Barkema et al. (1996) 
suggest that failure rates among foreign subsidiaries increase with cultural distance. 
Very et al. (1997) state that dissimilarity between merging firms’ national cultures 
negatively affects post-merger performance. Li and Guisinger (1991) find that the 
failure of US affiliates is significantly higher if the parent company is based in a 
culturally distant country rather than a culturally similar country. In contrast, O’Grady 
and Lane (1996) argue that operating in a psychically5 close country does not 
necessarily lead to superior performance, as the assumption of similarity prevents 
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executives from detecting subtle but important differences in the foreign market. Evans 
and Mavondo (2002) arrive at similar conclusions: psychic, cultural and business 
distance positively influence performance, because firms originating from similar 
markets may find it difficult to establish a clear basis for differentiation.  
The behavioral theory of the firm posits an alternative explanation of a positive 
relationship between cultural distance and satisfaction with organizational performance. 
Cyert and March (1963) and March (1994) argue that managers evaluate organizational 
performance relative to their “aspiration level”. An aspiration level, in Schneider’s 
(1992: 1053) words, is “the smallest outcome that would be deemed satisfactory by the 
decision maker”, and is used by decision-makers to determine the boundary between 
success and failure when evaluating performance. It appears that managers assess 
performance as being either high or low by comparing it with an aspiration level 
(Greve, 2003). The process of decision-making in uncertain environments revolves 
around a cycle of environmental scanning, interpretation and learning (Daft and Weick, 
1984). Managers interpret received information by using their “cognitive schemata, 
structures that encode past experiences and guide future actions” (Greve and Taylor, 
2000: 55), and learn by either continued exploitation of their current activities or by 
introducing explorative change (March, 1991). Differences in patterns of beliefs and 
values manifested in practices, behaviors and artifacts of culturally distant countries are 
typically obstructing information analysis, subsequent interpretation of firms’ 
experience and consequent learning processes.  
Due to such constraints, international managers may naturally develop low-level 
aspirations and expectations that eventually result in an easier satisfaction with 
subsidiary performance. Moreover, because subjective performance evaluation is highly 
dependent on the managers’ aspiration level, their perception of success depends on 
how the aspiration level is adjusted over time (Greve, 2003). Evidence suggests that 
aspiration levels are updated slowly, with recent performance given low weight relative 
to the prior aspiration level: Elsbach and Kramer (1996) report empirical evidence that 
managers are quick to explain performance downturns with reference to faults of the 
measurement criteria. Therefore, we may expect that with respect to culturally distant 
subsidiaries, the initial low aspiration/expectation level that results in an easy 
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satisfaction with performance, will most likely be sustained for some time, even if 
updated with less encouraging performance estimates. Hence, we have 
HYPOTHESIS 3 (cultural distance): National cultural distance between the MNE’s 
country of origin and the host nation is positively associated with managerial 
satisfaction with the subsidiary’s performance. 
 
Resource-Based Theory: Intangibles Intensity 
The resource-based theory (RBT) postulates that because intangible assets such as 
technological know-how, patents, management skills, brand names and best practices 
are information intensive, transactions with such assets are subject to market failures. 
Hence, intangible assets’ internalization becomes critical for their efficient exploitation 
(Lu and Beamish, 2004). Firms’ intangible assets encompass an array of unique 
characteristics: their development is capital, human and time-resource intensive, they 
can be applied in new markets at a proportionally smaller cost due to economies of 
scope, and international exploitation does not diminish their home market value 
(Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Delios and Beamish, 2001). When deployed abroad, 
knowledge-based intangible assets provide rent-yielding advantages for MNEs (Caves, 
1971), also because they give the foreign subsidiary a superior competitive position in 
the local marketplace (Isobe et al., 2000; Delios and Beamish, 2001). Morck and Yeung 
(1992) and Mishra and Gobeli (1998) empirically support this argument: they find a 
positive relationship between MNEs’ possession of intangible assets and their 
subsidiaries’ market value. Likewise, Delios and Beamish (2001) report a positive 
relationship between MNEs’ intangible asset endowments and the likelihood of their 
subsidiaries’ survival.  
Extant research suggests that the competitive advantages of MNEs frequently stem 
from offering highly innovative and highly differentiated products (Oviatt and 
McDougall, 1994). Due to a technology gap between firms from more developed 
markets and firms from transition countries, MNEs’ technological intensity offers an 
advantage in transition economies (Svetlicic and Rojec, 1994). Because this gap tends 
to be quite large, local firms in CEE transition countries cannot compete in product 
technologies with firms originating from developed market countries. They cannot 
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develop or offer new and sophisticated products in sufficient quantity and ditto quality 
to be competitive vis-à-vis firms from developed countries (Hitt et al., 2000). Thus, 
firms originating from developed economies are typically in possession of relatively 
complex technologies that, when transferred to transition economy subsidiaries, provide 
competitive advantages.  
In addition, by transferring marketing skills abroad MNEs often seek to generate 
firm-specific assets in the form of brand recognition and product differentiation in 
foreign markets (Denekamp, 1995). Evidence shows that firms recognized as leaders in 
marketing activities often try to gain market power by defeating competitors in foreign 
markets, aggressively creating brand-name loyalty and establishing their products as 
industry standards (Oviatt and McDougall, 1994). In contrast, for many decades CEE 
enterprises have shared organizational cultures that promoted production under 
centralized instruction rather than market demand, being characterized by consumer 
neglect. In such organizational cultures, there was typically limited – if any – use of 
marketing techniques. Clearly, marketing-intensive MNEs can benefit from a reduced 
level of local competition because re-programming obsolete organizational practices is 
difficult, takes time and is not always successful (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998). In 
this line of argument, we expect MNEs’ competitive advantage, stemming from 
technological and/or marketing intensity, to be favorably exploited by their subsidiaries 
in CEE countries. Launching a technologically or marketing-intensive product will 
create a competitive advantage over local competition, thus positively influencing 
satisfaction with performance. Hence,   
HYPOTHESIS 4 (intangibles intensity): The MNE’s intangibles intensity in terms of 
(a) technological and (b) advertising intensity is positively associated with 
managerial satisfaction with the subsidiary’s performance.  
 
International Management Theory: International Strategy 
International strategy, a key issue in international management theory (IMT), is a 
means to exploit the firm’s competitive advantages and establish complementary 
organizational capabilities (Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001). Considering the complexity 
of the MNE’s organizational form, there is a clear necessity for reducing this 
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complexity into a manageable number of related characteristics to understand and 
explain MNEs’ functions and behaviors (Harzing, 2000). To do so, we adopt the well-
known typology approach of Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989), along the lines of their 
integration-responsiveness framework6 and Dunning’s (1980) eclectic theory of 
international production, to examine to what extent following a global or a 
multidomestic international strategy may affect managerial satisfaction with subsidiary 
performance.   
Global companies promote a convergence of consumers’ preferences and strive to 
maximize standardization of production (Rugman and Verbeke, 1992). They benefit 
from home-country specific advantages, which can be efficiently transferred to foreign 
locations by creating “replicas” of the parent company (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989). 
Harzing (2000 & 2002) reports that global companies tend to exercise tight control over 
subsidiaries to preserve parents’ corporate culture, exploit their unique core 
competencies and funnel strategic decisions on production and marketing to the outlets. 
In contrast, multidomestic firms develop strategies for national responsiveness. Due to 
significant competitive differences between countries, a multidomestic strategy is 
determined by local cultural, political and social characteristics (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 
1989). Products and policies conform to different local demands and the MNE’s 
activities are usually “tied to the buyer’s location” (Harzing, 1999: 39). In order to 
fulfill the requirements for market-specific product customization, multidomestic firms 
must be aware of the specificity of local markets, policies and production nuances 
(Harzing, 2000). Thus, the primary objective then is the adaptation of marketing and 
production strategies to specific local customer needs and government requirements. 
Wright et al. (2005) raise a question that has, to date, not been fully addressed by 
research: can an MNE’s global strategy be extended and adapted with minimal changes 
to emerging economies? Or does a focus on emerging economies call for more strategic 
attention and tailor-made business models? Maybe a simple adaptation and extension of 
the traditional global strategy will not be sufficient in transition economies: an 
investment without understanding how location specificity affects firms and customers 
might not produce the anticipated positive results. Overall, emerging economies present 
a challenge to the global strategy concept (Wright et al., 2005). The traditional global 
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strategy is built on business models profiting from “the top of the global pyramid” – 
i.e., about a billion customers, mostly in the developed world –, whereas business 
models in emerging economies have to be based on profiting from the bottom of the 
global pyramid – that is, four billion people each making less than 2000 US$ a year 
(Prahalad and Hammond, 2002). Clearly, there are points of convergence between 
developed and emerging economies, but if Western MNEs only considered extant 
similarities, they may find themselves “trapped by their devices in gilded cages, serving 
the affluent few but ignoring the potential of the billions of new customers that attracted 
them in the first place” (Dawar and Chattopadhyay, 2002: 457). Perhaps a 
multidomestic approach, which incorporates market specificities and compromises 
between value and price, will prove to be the winning strategic solution for markets in 
transition.      
Dunning’s (1980) eclectic theory of international production postulates that the 
most prominent motives for foreign direct investment are those related to market-
seeking and/or factor-seeking strategies. MNEs that choose to pursue an export-oriented 
strategy are typically corporations that operate on a global basis, favoring a higher level 
of vertical integration to serve them as a tool to cut production costs by intra-firm 
exchange of production components. Global firms can leverage across various business 
opportunities because they are fit to move their production across countries in order to 
seek for the most competitive workers, suppliers and technologies (Bartlett and 
Ghoshal, 1989), or to respond to exchange rate movements, minimize taxes and avoid 
financial restrictions imposed by local governments (Kumar, 1994). Although global 
MNEs have an access to information on world markets, which makes them well 
equipped to counteract uncertainties and fluctuations, they are less fit to adapt to 
changes in the local market structure. Business operations in transition economies are 
subject to various risks and uncertainties (high inflation, unstable financial sector and 
foreign exchange regimes, et cetera). Therefore, an exclusively global focus and a 
neglect of local specificities could result in underperformance of the local subsidiaries 
due to underdeveloped capabilities to counteract environmental volatilities (Pan and 
Chi, 1999).  
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In contrast, firms that adopt a foreign market entry strategy that aims at establishing 
a sustainable local market presence tend to adapt strategies to better respond to local 
consumer preferences. These are typically MNEs following a multidomestic strategy, 
characterized by a primary concern with adaptation of operations and strategies. Unique 
market knowledge is accumulated during the process of customizing production, 
marketing and management activities. Consequently, multidomestic MNEs develop 
capabilities to react promptly to local environmental changes and market fluctuations. 
In several surveys among MNEs in CEE, seventy-five percent of the surveyed firms 
stated that the primary reason for investment was reflected in market-seeking motives, 
rather than manufacturing-for-export purposes (Heimpohl et al., 1993). It could be that 
expectations of reduced competition in the region, in addition to the associated better 
performance of Western firms, have further encouraged market-seeking entry 
(Uhlenbruck, 1997).  
Based on the above arguments, we argue that there is a need for profound 
understanding of local market forces and specificities to build a successful operation in 
CEE countries. Therefore, MNEs following a multidomestic type of strategy have 
greater chances for success than MNEs following a predominantly global strategy. 
Hence, MNEs’ investments to establish a market presence will result in greater 
satisfaction with the subsidiary’s performance than MNEs’ investments in export-
oriented production Thus, we propose 
HYPOTHESIS 5 (international strategy): (a) MNEs following a multidomestic 
strategy will be more satisfied with their subsidiary’s performance than those 
following a global strategy; and (b) a market-focused investment will be positively 




To test the above hypotheses, an international mail survey was conducted in May 2003 
among companies from the European Union (EU) that either acquired an existing local 
enterprise or had invested in a greenfield subsidiary in CEE. We initially selected from 
the AMADEUS dataset all registered companies based in the then-fifteen member 
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states of the EU that had established subsidiaries in CEE between 1992 and 2002, and 
that had at least a 10 per cent7 ownership stake in a subsidiary located in any of the 
following ten transition economies: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. These countries were 
chosen for this study because of the multifaceted economic and political significance of 
their 2004 and 2007 accession to the European Union.  
An English-language questionnaire was created and pilot tested with managers in 
four Dutch companies who were competent in both the English language and their 
firm’s international expansions into CEE. The final English-language questionnaire was 
then back translated into German (for German and Austrian companies), French (for 
French and Belgian companies) and Italian. In total, 2,798 questionnaires were initially 
mailed to west European CEOs at the MNEs’ headquarters with a request to have the 
questionnaires completed by a business unit top manager accountable for and 
knowledgeable of the latest CEE expansion. From this, 35 questionnaires were returned 
as non-deliverable. After compressing the targeted firms to 2,763, we received 209 
usable questionnaires, representing an overall response rate of 7.5 per cent. We further 
excluded the observations from Latvia and Lithuania due to unavailable data on cultural 
distances for these two countries, thus reducing the sample to 198 subsidiaries. The 
response varies from 64 for Poland to 5 for Slovenia. 
We tested the collected data for non-response bias. We conducted a t-test 
comparing the firm size variable (number of employees worldwide) of our sample to a 
random selection of the relevant MNE population, which revealed no statistically 
significant differences in the two means. Although we have a mix of predictors derived 
from primary and secondary-data sources, we also performed a common-method 
variance test. According to Podsakoff and Organ (1986), if all variables load on one 
factor or there is one factor that explains the majority of the variance, there is a 
common-method problem. We performed a factor analysis by entering all dependent 
and independent variables used in this study. Because the factor analysis resulted in a 
four-factor solution with the largest factor explaining 22 per cent of the variance only, 
we consider our data unconfined by common-method variance. 
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Dependent variables    
The dependent variable of this study, managerial satisfaction with subsidiary’s 
performance, was captured using subjective measures. Due to unavailable or 
inaccessible official financial reports for every subsidiary in all ten CEE countries for 
the time period from 1992 to 2002, we were unable to collect objective measures of 
performance at the subsidiary level. Furthermore, in studies involving firms from 
multiple home countries investing in multiple host countries, objective measures of 
performance may suffer from interpretation errors and measurement noise due to 
dissimilar accounting practices, differences in reporting company-level data and 
exchange rate fluctuations (Brouthers et al., 1999; Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000). 
Based on the experience with anonymous surveys by Woodcock et al. (1994) and 
Brouthers et al. (1999), who reported the unwillingness of firms to provide objective 
measures of performance for their foreign subsidiaries, we employed managerial 
evaluations to measure satisfaction with performance.  
Subjective measures can be used to proxy performance against multiple financial 
and non-financial criteria (Dess and Robinson, 1984). Subjective financial measures of 
performance provide valuable insights into the estimated achievements of the firm’s 
economic objectives (Brouthers, 2002). To limit the effect of recall and memory bias, 
we inquired about the MNEs’ most recent investment in CEE. We received a 
substantial number of questionnaires referring to investments made after the year 2000, 
which made financial measures of performance of limited importance, further justifying 
the introduction of subjective non-financial measures. After all, in the early stages of 
high-risk investments in such inefficient CEE environments, objective financial 
performance indicators are not that important. However, non-financial measures of 
performance provide important information about the firm’s competitive and strategic 
goals because managers tend to judge success or failure in terms of to-be-accomplished 
objectives (Anderson, 1990). Therefore, even in the early stages of a new enterprise’s 
existence, managers can evaluate the progress of meeting such pre-set objectives 
(Brouthers, 2002).  
We adopted the approach of previous studies and asked respondents to rate their 
satisfaction along eight performance dimensions: sales level, sales growth, profitability, 
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market share, marketing, distribution, reputation, and market access (Geringer and 
Hebert, 1991; Brouthers et al., 1999, 2000 & 2002). Respondents evaluated each 
performance measure on a scale ranging from 1, “very dissatisfied”, to 10, “very 
satisfied”. To assess the dimensionality of managers’ satisfaction with subsidiary’s 
performance and to reduce the number of variables, we performed a factor analysis. The 
results are reported in Table 1. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Using principle components analysis with the conventional eigenvalue cut-off level of 
one, we were able to extract two factors, which have a significant factor loading above 
0.50 (Hair et al., 1995). The first factor, named “satisfaction with financial 
performance” or Financial Performance, has substantial loadings for sales level, sales 
growth and profitability. The second factor, labeled “satisfaction with marketing 
performance” or Marketing Performance, has substantial loadings for reputation, 
market access, distribution and marketing. The variable “market share” was excluded 
from the analysis because it loaded substantially on both factors (0.51 and 0.63, 
respectively). Note that we refrain from formulating separate sets of hypotheses for 
both types of performance satisfaction measures. Given lack of earlier work on this, we 
will simply run separate regressions for our financial and marketing performance 
satisfaction measures to explore whether or not any interpretable differences will occur. 
 
Independent variables 
Our hypotheses relate to the influence of eight independent variables, in total. The first 
hypothesis is a straightforward transaction cost theory one, focusing on the impact of 
ownership stake of the Western MNE in the local CEE subsidiary. Ownership Stake 
was determined through the survey by inquiring about the actual percentage of foreign 
ownership in the CEE subsidiary.  
The second hypothesis deals with the effect of institutional inefficiency. Here, we 
used two measures. For one, we created a series of five-point Likert-type of questions 
(with answers ranging from very low to very high) inquiring about (a) the general 
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stability of host country’s political and social institutions, (b) barriers to conversion and 
repatriation of income, (c) level of corruption of political leaders, (d) ability of host 
country’s government to enforce existing laws, (e) efficiency of government agencies 
and institutions, and (f) legal restrictions to foreign ownership. High values demonstrate 
perceived Institutional Instability. The scale’s high Cronbach’s alpha coefficient 
indicates internal consistency (α = .74, which is above the .7 cut-off level). Moreover, 
to guarantee the robustness of our analyses, we included an institutional variable 
derived from a secondary source, namely the 2004 Transparency International 
Corruption Perception Index (http://www.transparency.org), or CPI. We calculated an 
Institutional Corruption score by measuring the distance in corruption estimates 
between home and host countries. For every observation in our sample, that is, we 
subtracted the CPI score of the host nation from the CPI score of the relevant home 
country. We chose the CPI source to measure the inefficiency of the institutional 
environment for two reasons. For one, according to recent research by the World Bank 
and the EBRD, corruption is often portrayed as the major institutional constraint on 
business (Hellman et al., 2000). A secondary reason for choosing the CPI source is that 
there exist high correlations between CPI scores and other potential measures of a 
country’s institutional inefficiency. For example, Brouthers and colleagues (2004) 
report that the Euromoney risk measure is highly correlated with the CPI (r = .70), the 
EBRD measure of institutional factors (r = .88), the World Bank’s institutional 
measures (r = .79) and Henisz’s political constraints measure (r = .85).  
For our third hypothesis, Cultural Distance was measured following Kogut and 
Singh’s  (1988) formula, based on Hofstede’s (2001) updated national culture scores. 
To date, Hofstede’s study is the only one providing cultural distance indices for the 
CEE nations central in this study. Kogut and Singh (1988) defined national cultural 
distance as the degree to which cultural norms in one country differ from those in 
another country. A number of authors followed up on this definition by providing 
empirical evidence on the direct association of critical routines and repertoires within 
firms in different countries with the national cultural distance between them (Hofstede, 
1980 & 2001; Shane, 1993; Morosini et al., 1998; Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000). 
Shane (1995) and Morosini and colleagues (1998) express concerns about the 
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occurrence of common-method variance when individuals answer questions about their 
cultural values and the effect of those values (in our case, on their satisfaction with 
performance). However, a correlation between Hofstede’s cultural distance indices and 
the satisfaction with performance scores derived from our survey cannot be an artifact 
of a common-source bias, by definition. Furthermore, due to a natural tendency toward 
ethnocentricity and a preference for similarity, interviewed managers might recall the 
national culture of the target country as being more similar to their own than it really is. 
Using the natural culture scores from a source external to our sample and not dependent 
on the memory of the respondents, we avoid this problem of retrospective 
rationalization (Morosini et al., 1998). 
Relating to our fourth hypothesis, Caves (1996) noted that R&D and advertising 
intensities have emerged as the most robust measures of intangible assets in the 
literature on MNEs. Therefore, we adopted the two measures of this pair of intangible 
assets most commonly used in the literature (Morck and Yeung, 1991; Delios and 
Beamish, 1999; Lu and Beamish, 2004). Technological Intensity is obtained by asking 
the respondents a five-point Likert-type of question as to the percentage of sales spent 
on R&D (ranging from very low to very high), because it was believed that the 
surveyed sample of managers would be unlikely to answer adequately or at all 
questions regarding a monetary estimation of the annual R&D budget. Following the 
same logic, we obtained Advertising Intensity by asking the respondents a five-point 
Likert-type of question as to the percentage of sales spent on marketing and advertising 
activities. The decision to use primary data to proxy both intensity variables was based 
mostly on pragmatic reasons: official secondary data on R&D and advertising 
expenditures for all surveyed firms were simply unavailable.  
With respect to our fifth hypothesis, an International Strategy measure was obtained 
by asking two sets of multi-scale questions describing multidomestic and global 
strategies. The questions were adapted from Harzing (2000 & 2002), who constructed 
four statements that measure whether international competition in the industry of 
investment is predominantly global and focused on achieving economies of scale or 
multidomestic and aiming at local differentiation. We performed a cluster analysis, 
which resulted in a two-cluster grouping of the four constructs as multidomestic and 
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global, and performed an independent-samples t-test to check for significant difference 
in the mean scores of the two groups. Clearly, the profiles of the multidomestic and 
global strategies are significantly different, along the lines expected by the theory, as is 
clear from Table 2. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The type of international strategy is captured by a dummy variable taking the value of 1 
if the strategy is predominantly multidomestic, and 0 if it is predominantly global. 
Furthermore, to obtain our Market Focus variable, we asked respondents two questions 
referring to their strategic intentions to enter into the respective market: is their 
investment aimed at either establishing a local presence to supply the host market, or at 
setting up a low-cost production site for export purposes (Meyer, 1998). We defined a 
dummy variable with a value of 1 if the investment had a market focus, and 0 if it had 
an export-oriented focus.  
 
Control variables 
Eight control variables were included. For one, we asked for the Establishment Mode – 
i.e., the choice between a greenfield establishment or an acquisition mode. According to 
several studies, performance of greenfields should be systematically better than that of 
acquisitions (Woodcock et al., 1994; Li, 1995), while others suggest differently based 
on the assumption that because acquisitions are less risky than greenfields, the former 
should outperform the latter (Pennings et al., 1994; Caves, 1996). Regardless of the 
divergent findings in earlier work, it is clear that the two establishment modes might 
well have different performance implications.  
We follow the reasoning of Padmanabhan and Cho (1999), who argue that once the 
decision to invest in a foreign country has been made, as opposed to a non-equity entry, 
international experience (or level of multinationality) becomes less important than other 
types of experience. Unlike previous studies that tested for the effect of multinationality 
on performance, we introduce three alternative measures of international experience. 
First, we included Acquisition Experience, comprised of a composite measure of the 
number of acquisitions and the number of countries that hosted them. Second, a similar 
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composite measure – Greenfield Experience – controls for the number of foreign 
greenfield establishments. Third, a Regional Experience control variable, measured as 
the number of years experience doing business in any CEE country, was taken on 
board. All information is from the questionnaire. 
Christensen and Montgomery (1981) associated performance effects specifically 
with relative industry growth. Hence, we included a host country’s Industry Growth 
rate variable. Due to the heterogeneity of our observations and the significant range of 
industries of investment, secondary data on industry growth in all host countries were 
either unavailable or incomparable. Therefore, we obtained our industry growth control 
variable by asking the respondents to estimate, with a five-point Likert-type answer 
scale, the host country’s growth rate of the industry of their investment.  
Finally, we include three standard control variables. Previous research has found 
that firm size influences performance: an individual subsidiary is less important to a 
large firm than to a relatively small one, and therefore may receive less attention and 
support (Slangen, 2005). We control for Firm Size through the approximate number of 
their MNE’s employees worldwide. Furthermore, years of experience in a particular 
industry sector in a given host country are expected to exert a substantial influence on 
performance (Oliver, 1997). To control for such experience, we created a variable 
Subsidiary Age by calculating the years of existence since the establishment of the 
subsidiary. To control for the Industry Type, we used the OECD classification of 
manufacturing industries based on technology, and created three dummy variables: a 
first dummy for high and medium-high technology industries, a second dummy for 
medium-low and low-technology industries, and a the third dummy for all industries 
that fall outside the OECD categorization (for example, service firms, building 
contractors, agricultural producers and wholesalers). The primary information about the 
industry of investment is obtained through the survey. 
 
Statistical methods 
To test our hypotheses, we performed two ordinary least-squares multiple regression 
analyses with SPSS 11.0, one for the financial and one for the marketing performance 
satisfaction measure. To reveal the explanatory power of our independent variables as a 
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set, we ran two models – Models 1 and 3 – with the control variables only, before 
adding our independent variables in Models 2 and 4. Table 3 reports the usual 
descriptives. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Two correlation coefficients stand out: .664 between two industry classification 
dummies, and .557 between the two dependent variables. For each of the regression 
runs, variance-inflation factors (VIF) were examined to determine any potential 
multicollinearity bottleneck. All of the VIF scores were below 2, thus confirming that 
multicollenearity is not an issue here (Hair et al., 1995). Tests for heteroskedasticity and 




The results of the regression analyses are shown in Table 4.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Clearly, the full models perform much better than the models with control variables 
only. As far as the control variables is concerned, half of them are not associated with 
significant estimates at all: Establishment mode, Firm size, Subsidiary age and Industry 
type are apparently unrelated to managerial satisfaction with subsidiary performance. In 
both Marketing Performance regressions, only Acquisition experience and Industry 
growth reach significance: with more acquisition experience and higher industry 
growth, managers are more satisfied with the marketing performance of their 
subsidiaries. In the full Financial Performance Model 4, the estimates for Greenfield 
experience (negative), Industry growth (positive) and Regional experience (positive) 
are significant. The results for our three experience measures point to a particularly 
interesting avenue for future research. 
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We observe significant differences between the results for both performance 
measures, comparing Models 2 and 4: the variance explained in the Marketing 
Performance satisfaction regression is much higher than the one in the Financial 
Performance counterpart. In addition, the contribution of the independent variables in 
our fourth model, demonstrated by the values of the beta coefficients, is much lower 
than in the second model. It could be that the results of the Marketing Performance 
analysis carry more explanatory power because of the methodology applied: managers’ 
opinion of a subsidiary’s financial performance (sales growth, sales level and 
profitability) measured with a Likert-type of question is perhaps less accurate and 
representative than the “real” picture presented by officially published or internally 
available financial reports. 
More importantly, the stronger explanatory power of our predictors in the 
Marketing Performance analysis possibly suggests that subjective measures of non-
financial performance, as opposed to subjective financial estimates, may be of greater 
strategic importance for the subsidiaries’ managers. From a long-term strategy 
perspective, subsidiary’s performance in the sense of distribution, marketing, market 
access and reputation may be more valuable for the parent MNE than the short-term 
growth or profitability of the outlet. Several authors have argued that foreign 
investments may not be undertaken solely to increase short-run financial performance 
(Anderson, 1990; Geringer and Hebert, 1991). They suggest that increased financial 
performance may not occur for a number of years after initial foreign market entry, but 
that other measures of performance may help to determine the effectiveness of the 
investment. This argument may hold true particularly in high-risk and “young” markets 
such as those in CEE. 
Model 2 tests the hypothesized effects of our predictors on managerial satisfaction 
with the subsidiary’s Marketing Performance. The Ownership stake coefficient is 
positive and significant, offering support for Hypothesis 1. Both the Institutional 
instability and Cultural distance predictors are significant and have the expected sign, 
thus providing support for Hypothesis 2a and 3. Hypothesis 2b is rejected, given the 
non-significant estimate of the Institutional corruption coefficient. Hypothesis 4 is 
partially supported – i.e., Hypothesis 4b is confirmed, but Hypothesis 4a is not: 
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Advertising intensity is significantly and positively related to satisfaction with 
Marketing Performance, whilst Technological intensity is significantly but negatively 
related to satisfaction with Marketing Performance (which is opposite to what was 
expected). Hypothesis 5a is supported: the coefficient of the International strategy 
variable is positive and significant, as hypothesized. The significance of our Market 
focus predictor and its positive sign offer support for Hypothesis 5b. 
In Model 4, we analyze managers’ satisfaction with Financial Performance. 
Hypothesis 1 is not supported, as the coefficient estimate for the Ownership stake 
variable fails to reach significance. Hypothesis 2 is partially confirmed, due to the 
significance and expected sign of the Institutional corruption estimate (Hypothesis 2b) 
but the insignificant coefficient for the Institutional instability variable. Hypothesis 3 is 
supported: the Cultural distance coefficient is significantly positive. Hypothesis 4 
receives partial support, due to the unexpected negative sign of the Technological 
intensity coefficient (Hypothesis 4a) and the expected positive and significant estimate 
for the Advertising intensity variable (Hypothesis 4b). The coefficient of the 
International strategy variable has the expected sign, but is insignificant. Hence, 
Hypothesis 5a cannot be supported. Our Market focus predictor is not significant in the 
fourth model either: therefore, Hypothesis 5b is rejected, too. 
     
DISCUSSION 
Tan and Litschert (1994) suggest that the environment in transition economies, 
characterized by a weak regulatory regime, underdeveloped factor markets and poorly 
protected property rights, is typically hostile to business. In such contexts, transactions 
costs are likely to be high, which is why a large ownership stake is needed to reach a 
satisfactory level of performance. Indeed, we find support for this argument for the case 
of satisfaction with marketing performance, but not for the financial performance case. 
Our interpretation is that this asymmetric result can be explained by the relative 
unimportance of short-run financial performance objectives for many FDI entries into a 
high-risk region such as CEE, particularly in the early stages after entry. 
Studies have concluded that legal efficiency is positively correlated with the role of 
the court system, and that malfunctions regarding corporate governance have high 
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explanatory power for the mediocre performance of the private sector in transition 
economies (Johnson et al., 1999). In the case of CEE, EUMAP (Open Society 
Institute’s EU Monitoring and Advocacy Program) acknowledges the impressive 
progress towards establishing democracy, the rule of law and a market economy in the 
region. However, it points out that the inherited tradition of entrenched mistrust of the 
state is conductive to the persistence of corruption. According to the 2002 EBRD report 
on transition, the level of government corruption in CEE is still very high: for example, 
the percentage of firms frequently bribing public officials is as high as 22.6 in Hungary 
and 36.7 in Romania. A possible explanation for the high levels of corruption in the 
region is the nature of the transition process: all CEE countries have undertaken 
transitional tasks that are inherently vulnerable to corruption, including the privatization 
of their entire economies (EUMAP, 2005).  
In the 2002 and 2003 reports on progress with EU accession, the European 
Commission makes frequent references to problems with corruption, because they 
impede the smooth functioning of the single market, the quality of democratic 
institutions and the core democratic values the EU seeks to represent. Furthermore, with 
the accession of the first eight CEE countries, the EU has admitted a number of 
countries with persistent and serious problems of corruption (EUMAP, 2005). The 
magnitude of the problem is further emphasized by EU’s annual declaration on 
candidate states, which recommends a “safeguard clause”, possibly delaying accession 
of either Bulgaria or Romania if their judicial reforms stall. The document concludes 
that while both candidates continue to fulfill the political criteria for EU membership, 
there is a dire need for improvements in the reforms of their public administration, the 
functioning of their judicial system and the fight against corruption (Sofia News 
Agency, 2004). Clearly, the empirical evidence provided in this study further supports 
these arguments, revealing that institutional deficiencies in the CEE region have a 
preponderating negative effect on local economies and foreign investments: because 
institutional inefficiency has a negative effect on the western managers’ satisfaction 
with their subsidiary’s performance, we conclude that institutional inefficiency indeed 
presents a considerable impediment to business.  
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We provide further support for Uhlenbruck’s (2003) suggestion that culture remains 
a prominent issue even during the turbulent economic transition process: our empirical 
analyses reveal that cultural distance strongly influences managers’ satisfaction with 
their subsidiary’s performance. Previously, studies on the effects on performance of 
cultural differences between two countries reveal that the more dissimilar the norms, 
values, customs and business practices are (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Hofstede, 2001), 
the lower the performance of culturally distant subsidiaries will be (Barkema et al., 
1996). Perhaps surprisingly, our findings highlight the fact that west European 
managers evaluate the performance of subsidiaries in countries with more dissimilar 
routines, repertoires and working styles more favorable than the performance in 
countries that are culturally closer to their home nations. Our interpretation is that 
managers of west European MNEs are initially uncertain of their success in a culturally 
different environment or skeptical of the performance of their culturally distant CEE 
subsidiaries, and therefore adjust their aspirations to a lower level. As a consequence, a 
low aspiration level could eventually result in a satisfactory evaluation of the 
subsidiary’s performance. Furthermore, valuable knowledge about culturally imbedded 
practices is acquired through an investment in a culturally distant CEE country. If that 
knowledge is of critical importance for the MNE’s development of organizational 
practices, the strategic importance of the subsidiary will favorably influence a positive 
evaluation of its performance.  
The present study identifies to what extent vital capabilities of MNEs determine 
their managers’ satisfaction with subsidiaries’ performance in CEE transition 
economies. Advertising intensity positively affects satisfaction with distribution, 
marketing, firm reputation and market access at the subsidiary level, whilst 
technological intensity has the opposite effect. Meyer (2001) points out that in Eastern 
Europe technology transfer is of secondary importance to the transfer of modern 
managerial skills. Marketing expertise is an asset of great importance in CEE, however, 
because in the central planning system enterprises produced under instruction and not 
for the market, thus implying that modern marketing knowledge was once rendered 
redundant. Importing marketing skills from developed-economy firms, on the one hand, 
creates a competitive advantage over local products and brands and, on the other hand, 
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marketing and advertisement leaders can gain market power by defeating global 
competitors in foreign markets by aggressively creating brand-name loyalty.  
Reversely, technology transfer in CEE is difficult and conditional on the 
establishment mode (a greenfield or an acquisition). In the case of a greenfield, 
technologically intensive MNEs not only need to transfer modern technology and 
equipment, but also must engage in extensive re-training of local labor to overcome the 
deficiencies of divergent educational systems. The process of re-training is very time 
consuming, and may involve unforeseen expenditures and delays. Therefore, the 
positive outcome of MNEs’ technological “superiority” will most likely be obstructed. 
In the case of an acquisition, western MNEs acquire local enterprises with weak and 
outdated technological capabilities. To make production facilities competitive, the 
MNE generally needs to make significant post-acquisition investments to restructure 
the local enterprise, change its corporate strategy and structure, and engage in 
technological modernization (Newman, 2000; Meyer, 2001). However, strong inertial 
forces within an organization might prevent even technologically rational adaptations, 
which put further burden on the post-acquisition integration process (Barkema and 
Vermeulen, 1998). In conclusion, regardless of the establishment mode, technology 
transfer is difficult and time consuming in CEE countries. Therefore, the positive effect 
predicted by theory in transition economies is unlikely to be reflected in short-term 
evaluations of subsidiary performance.8    
In the early 1990s, the CEE countries not only experienced major political and 
economic changes, but also an annual decline in GDP by approximately 20 per cent. 
During these first years of expansion into CEE, the GDP decline may have curtailed 
initially foreseen benefits from entering into these new markets. Consequently, market-
seeking FDI has produced rather disappointing results (Uhlenbruck, 1997). Our survey 
conducted in 2003 reveals opposite results: investments aiming at establishing a market 
presence resulted in high satisfaction with the subsidiaries’ performance. At least two 
incremental changes in the region may have triggered a more optimistic perspective on 
performance. First, after 1995, there was generally a more positive outlook on CEE 
economies (Transition Report, 1996). Second, in the period 1995-2003, most of the 
countries in the region initiated negotiations for EU membership, demonstrated 
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considerable progress in their transition, and reached a consensus on a future date for 
accession (i.e., May 2004). The prospects of an enlarged EU common market presented 
a lucrative opportunity of serving an additional 150 million consumers, yet imposed a 
threat of labor cost equalization in a foreseeable future. Clearly, in a greater EU of 25 
member states, a long-term factor-seeking strategy cannot be ultimately viable, while an 
establishment of a stable market presence in CEE is mostly promising. Furthermore, a 
stable market presence goes hand in hand with a multidomestic strategic approach, 
rather than adopting a global strategy in a new environment. A recent survey of the 
Hungarian retail market points to the key success factor for one of the best-performing 
western retailers (UK-based Tesco): a meticulous attention to local market 
characteristics, namely ultra-high price sensitivity, local sourcing of most retailed 
products, and a wide selection of local favorites (Budapest Week Online, 2005).  
This study has several limitations, all pointing to interesting avenues for future 
research. First, the insufficient number of respondents by industry prevents us from 
investigating in-depth the industry-level factors that might influence managers’ 
satisfaction with their subsidiary’s performance. Future studies may overcome this 
drawback by focusing on a limited number of industries, investigating detailed 
industry-specific factors that may determine a particular foreign investment mode 
preference. Second, the time window of the collected data implies a methodological 
weakness. The survey inquired about the latest CEE entry, yet in many cases the time 
gap was over five years, which increases the chances of recall and memory biases 
typical of retrospective surveys. A better response accuracy will be achieved if future 
studies avoid surveying firms that have not made relevant investments within a shorter 
time period. Third, our study is limited to foreign entry decisions by west European 
MNEs into a pre-selected set of CEE countries. Further work is needed to find out to 
which extent our findings are generalizable to other transition or non-transition 
countries, and to MNEs from other parts of the world. 
Clearly, a multi-theory perspective that takes into consideration both the MNEs’ 
asset specificities and the host-countries’ environmental idiosyncrasies offers a better 
platform for determining the drivers of performance than single-theory lenses. Indeed, 
our set of five theories produced hypotheses that proved to make sense in the context of 
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explaining managerial satisfaction with the performance of subsidiaries of west 
European MNEs in CEE countries. Nevertheless, one critical question remains 
unanswered: What is the relative importance of all tested predictors on managerial 
satisfaction with performance, and in what situation will institutional inefficiency be a 
more important determinant of subsidiaries’ performance than the MNEs’ capabilities? 
Furthermore, which of the institutional forces have a greater impact on MNEs’ 
activities in transition economies: differences in legal systems, government corruption 
or political instability? Can we assume that, because of the decade-long EU integration 
programs in CEE, there are hardly any institutional differences between the old and 
new EU members, and that such differences are in fact only a false managerial 
perception? Future research could achieve in-depth understanding of firms’ 
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Table 1. Factor analysis of performance measures 
 
Rotated factor matrix 





Satisfaction with Financial Performance measures (α = .87)    
          Satisfaction with sales level 0.88 - 
          Satisfaction with sales growth 0.87 - 
          Satisfaction with profitability 0.82 - 
Satisfaction with Marketing Performance measures   (α = .89)   
          Satisfaction with reputation 0.34 0.82 
          Satisfaction with market access - 0.77 
          Satisfaction with distribution - 0.87 
          Satisfaction with marketing - 0.86 
Eigenvalues 1.19 4.87 









Items (Scale:  Strongly disagree   1    2    3    4    5    Strongly agree) 
                                          
(a) Our company’s worldwide strategy was focused on achieving economies of scale by 
concentrating its important activities at a limited number of locations. 
 
(b) Our company’s competitive position was defined in worldwide terms. Different national product 
markets were closely linked and interconnected. Competition took place on a global basis. 
 
(c) Our company’s worldwide competitive strategy was to let each subsidiary compete on a 
domestic level as national product markets were judged too different to make competition on a 
global level possible. 
 
(d)  Our company not only recognized national differences in taste and values, but also actually tried 
to respond to these national differences by consciously adapting products and policies to the local 
market.









Global 3.08 3.78 2.01 2.67 
Multidomestic 2.63 2.05 4.12 3.92 
t-value 2.497 (0.013) 10.525 (0.000) -16.231 (0.000) -7.809 (0.000) 
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Table 3: Means, standard deviations and correlations among all variables 
 
     VARIABLES n MEAN S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1. Marketing Performance 22.46 9.56                    
2. Financial Performance 16.23 7.19 .557**                   
3. Institutional Instability 22.30 4.56 -.073 -.061                  
4. Institutional Corruptness 4.07 1.25 .101 .065 .126                 
5. Cultural Distance 1.85 1.70 .181* .155* .246** .449**                
6. Technological Intensity 2.07 1.07 -.180** -.039 -.036 -.061 -.009               
7. Advertising Intensity 2.06 1.13 .157* .057 .019 .063 -.053 .146*              
8. Market Focus .83 .38 .279** -.067 -.001 .093 .073 -.137* .142*             
9. International Strategy  .58 .49 .249** .040 -.024 .025 .019 -.110 .094 .227**            
10. Ownership Stake .87 .22 .065 .102 .126 -.071 -.058 .095 -.058 -.073 -.087           
11. Establishment Mode .36 .48 .002 -.020 -.217** -.027 -.037 -.032 -.068 -.052 -.114 -.226**          
12. Acquisition Experience 10.90 35.11 .126 .092 .109 .063 .162* -.039 -.047 -.073 -.117 .016 .214*         
13. Greenfield Experience 15.59 34.90 .043 .012 .072 -.029 .027 .003 .016 -.012 -.064 .108 -.079 .396**        
14. Industry Growth 3.20 1.06 .150* .196** -.013 -.040 -.033 .102 .082 .142* .007 -.046 -.074 -.034 .017       
15. Regional Experience 11.66 14.80 .066 .140* -.094 .072 .067 .065 -.038 .060 -.002 .046 -.009 .016 .335** .105      
16. Firm Size 86.56 24.72 .069 -.043 .022 .106 .097 .012 .103 .040 -.020 .034 .213** .367** .188** -.043 -.034     
17. Subsidiary Age 4.93 3.37 -.076 -.009 .144* .005 -.142* -.062 -.024 -.075 -.041 .038 .019 .069 .039 -.226** -.017 -.070    
18. High-Tech Industry  .20 .40 -.112 .029 -.050 -.015 -.155* .290** .015 -.092 -.108 .120 .068 .132 .214** -.059 .141* .091 .149*   
19. Low-Tech Industry  .36 .48 .021 .038 .003 -.084 .121 -.042 .046 .006 -.045 -.015 .021 -.013 -.208** .046 -.120 -.103 -.120 -.383**  
20. Non-OECD Industry .43 .49 .070 -.060 .039 .094 .010 -.194** -.057 .068 .131 -.082 -.075 -.094 .029 .003 .003 .027 .003 -.436** -.664** 
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Table 4: Multiple regression analysis  
Constant 19.601 (6.66)***    15.530** (2.82)  16.043*** (6.66)   17.069** (3.02) 
Establishment Mode -0.252 (-0.15)           1.188     (0.71)  -0.252      (-0.15)      0.165     (0.10) 
Acquisition Experience  4.425†   (1.97)         4.298*    (2.04)   4.425†    (1.97)         2.780     (1.27) 
Greenfield Experience -1.345   (-0.58)        -1.447    (-0.68)  -1.345    (-0.58)      -3.667†   (-1.68) 
Industry Growth  1.181†   (1.67)         1.669*    (2.48)   1.181†   (1.67)         2.126** (3.17) 
Regional Experience  5.163    (1.12)         3.044      (0.70)   5.163    (1.12)         9.987*    (2.36) 
Firm Size  1.220    (0.16)         8.630      (0.12)   1.220    (0.16)         5.832     (0.80) 
Subsidiary Age  -0.131   (-0.59)        3.161      (0.02)  -0.131   (-0.59)        0.107      (0.51) 
High-Technology Industries -3.163   (-1.57)        -0.314    (-0.15)  -3.163   (-1.57)        1.947      (0.95) 
Low-Technology Industries -1.385   (0.85)         -1.513    (-0.92)  -1.385   (-0.85)       -0.165     (0.10) 
Ownership Stake (H1)                                  9.609** (2.99)                                   5.191     (1.56) 
Institutional Instability (H2a)                                 -0.321*  (-2.02)                                  -0.140     (-0.87)  
Institutional Corruption (H2b)                                 -0.646    (-1.00)                                  -1.426*   (-2.12) 
Cultural Distance (H3)                                  1.217*    (2.60)                                   1.431**  (2.96) 
Technological Intensity (H4a)                                 -2.072**(-2.99)                                   -1.311†   (-1.87) 
Advertising Intensity (H4b)                                  1.515*    (2.39)                                    1.066†    (1.68) 
International Strategy (H5a)                                  3.971**  (3.04)                                 2.035     (1.37)  
Market Focus (H5b)                                  4.873*    (2.45)                                -1.505    (-0.73) 
N  171                          162   171                        163 
F 1.471                        4.079***  1.649                      2.234** 
Adjusted R2 0.08                          0.34   0.09                       0.21 
 
Two-tailed tests: † p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001  (standardized beta coefficients and t-statistics 
presented).  
 
Independent variables Marketing Performance           
Model 1                 Model2 
Financial Performance             
Model 3                 Model 4 
   Betas     t-stat        Betas     t-stat  Betas     t-stat         Betas     t-stat   
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Transaction cost theory 
(TCT) 
 
                H1 
 
Institutional inefficiency  H2  Managerial satisfaction    H3 Cultural distance 
New Institutional Theory     with      Behavioral theory of the firm 
(NIT)       subsidiary performance    (BTF) 
 
 
             H4              H5 
 
Intangibles intensity          International strategy 
Resource-based theory         International management theory 
(RBT)            (IMT)
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NOTES 
                                               
1
 We refrain from reviewing the literature on the evolutionary role of subsidiaries in MNEs (see 
Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998) and draw upon traditional academic models that view subsidiaries as either 
market access providers or recipients of the parents’ technology transfer (Vernon, 1986). 71 per cent of 
our observations refer to investments made after 1995, thus considering the model of subsidiary 
evolution by Birkinshaw and Hood (1998), we believe the CEE subsidiaries in this study are in a rather 
early stage of evolution and therefore dependent on parents’ decisions regarding allocation of activities. 
Hence, our focus is on parents’ subjective evaluation exclusively.   
2
 Scott (1995) conceptualizes institutional forces into three groups: regulative, normative and cognitive. 
We concentrate primarily on the effect of regulative institutions because regulative forces are the most 
commonly studied in international business (Delios and Beamish, 1999; Brouthers, 2002). In addition, 
we study cultural distance to capture the second institutional pillar, namely countries’ normative forces 
(values and norms). 
3
 Hoskisson et al. (2000) identified 64 emerging economies, among which 51 are rapidly growing 
developing countries and 13 are in transition from centrally planned economies (they are mostly referred 
to as transition economies). 
4
 Brouthers (2002) studies the performance of subsidiaries of EU firms in an unspecified range of 
transition economies. 
5
 Psychic distance can be defined as the distance between the home market and a foreign market, 
resulting from the perception of both cultural and business differences (Evans and Mavondo, 2002). 
6
 Bartlett and Ghoshal’s (1989) typology describes four strategic types of multinational companies: 
global, multidomestic, international and transnational. We only examine the influence of global strategy 
and multidomestic strategy due to a lack of empirical support for the existence of international strategy 
(Harzing, 2000) and the ambiguity about the empirical support for the transnational solution. 
7
 We comply with the majority of empirical studies that use a stake of 10 per cent and above in a foreign 
enterprise as a minimum to qualify as a foreign direct investment (Benito and Gripsurd, 1992; 
Padmanabhan and Cho, 1999; Larimo, 2002). 
8
 Note that only 67 (32%) of the investments in our sample were made before 1998. Therefore, we 
regard the majority of the evaluations as short-term ones. 
